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Capec-302 Detail
TCP FIN Scan
Detailed Communications Software Typical Severity: Low
Parents: 300
Threats: T60 T65 T80 T258 T273 T288 T291 T302 T334 T392 T407
An adversary uses a TCP FIN scan to determine if ports are closed on the target machine. This scan type is accomplished by sending TCP segments with the FIN bit set in the packet header. The RFC 793 expected behavior is that any TCP segment with an out-of-state Flag sent to an open port is discarded, whereas segments with out-of-state flags sent to closed ports should be handled with a RST in response. This behavior should allow the adversary to scan for closed ports by sending certain types of rule-breaking packets (out of sync or disallowed by the TCB) and detect closed ports via RST packets.
In addition to its relative speed in comparison with other types of scans, the major advantage a TCP FIN Scan is its ability to scan through stateless firewall or ACL filters. Such filters are configured to block access to ports usually by preventing SYN packets, thus stopping any attempt to 'build' a connection. FIN packets, like out-of-state ACK packets, tend to pass through such devices undetected. FIN scanning is still relatively stealthy as the packets tend to blend in with the background noise on a network link.
| External ID | Source | Link | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-302 | capec | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/302.html | |
| CWE-200 | cwe | http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | |
| REF-33 | reference_from_CAPEC | Stuart McClure, Joel Scambray, George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & Solutions (6th Edition), 2009, McGraw Hill | |
| REF-128 | reference_from_CAPEC | http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Information Processing Techniques Office, Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California, RFC793 - Transmission Control Protocol, 1981--09, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) |
| REF-147 | reference_from_CAPEC | Gordon "Fyodor" Lyon, Nmap Network Scanning: The Official Nmap Project Guide to Network Discovery and Security Scanning (3rd "Zero Day" Edition), 2008, Insecure.com LLC, ISBN: 978-0-9799587-1-7 | |
| REF-130 | reference_from_CAPEC | http://phrack.org/issues/51/11.html | Gordon "Fyodor" Lyon, The Art of Port Scanning (Volume: 7, Issue. 51), Phrack Magazine, 1997 |
Experiment
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An adversary sends TCP packets with the FIN flag but not associated with an existing connection to target ports.
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An adversary uses the response from the target to determine the port's state. If no response is received the port is open. If a RST packet is received then the port is closed.
- FIN scanning requires the use of raw sockets, and thus cannot be performed from some Windows systems (Windows XP SP 2, for example). On Unix and Linux, raw socket manipulations require root privileges.
- This attack pattern requires the ability to send TCP FIN segments to a host during network reconnaissance. This can be achieved via the use of a network mapper or scanner, or via raw socket programming in a scripting language. Packet injection tools are also useful for this purpose. Depending upon the method used it may be necessary to sniff the network in order to see the response.
Not present
| Authorization | Access Control | Confidentiality |
|---|---|---|
| Bypass Protection Mechanism | Bypass Protection Mechanism | Other |
| Hide Activities | Hide Activities | Bypass Protection Mechanism |
| Hide Activities |
Not present