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Capec-275 Detail
DNS Rebinding
Detailed Software Likelihood: High Typical Severity: Very High
Parents: 194
Threats: T59 T263 T292 T307
| External ID | Source | Link | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| CAPEC-275 | capec | https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/275.html | |
| CWE-350 | cwe | http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/350.html | |
| REF-119 | reference_from_CAPEC | Collin Jackson, Adam Barth, Andrew Bortz, Weidong Shao, Dan Boneh, Protecting Browsers from DNS Rebinding Attacks, In Proceedings of ACM CCS 07 | |
| REF-120 | reference_from_CAPEC | http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_rebinding | Wikipedia, The Wikimedia Foundation, Inc |
Explore
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Identify potential DNS rebinding targets: An adversary publishes content on their own server with their own name and DNS server. Attract HTTP traffic and explore rebinding vulnerabilities in browsers, flash players of old version.
| Techniques |
|---|
| Adversary uses Web advertisements to attract the victim to access adversary's DNS. Explore the versions of web browser or flash players in HTTP request. |
Experiment
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Establish initial target access to adversary DNS: The first time the target accesses the adversary's content, the adversary's name must be resolved to an IP address. The adversary's DNS server performs this resolution, providing a short Time-To-Live (TTL) in order to prevent the target from caching the value.
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Rebind DNS resolution to target address: The target makes a subsequent request to the adversary's content and the adversary's DNS server must again be queried, but this time the DNS server returns an address internal to the target's organization that would not be accessible from an outside source.
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Determine exploitability of DNS rebinding access to target address: The adversary can then use scripts in the content the target retrieved from the adversary in the original message to exfiltrate data from the named internal addresses.
Exploit
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Access & exfiltrate data within the victim's security zone: The adversary can then use scripts in the content the target retrieved from the adversary in the original message to exfiltrate data from the internal addresses. This allows adversaries to discover sensitive information about the internal network of an enterprise.
| Techniques |
|---|
| Adversary attempts to use victim's browser as an HTTP proxy to other resources inside the target's security zone. This allows two IP addresses placed in the same security zone. |
| Adversary tries to scan and access all internal hosts in victim's local network by sending multiple short-lived IP addresses. |
- The target browser must access content server from the adversary controlled DNS name. Web advertisements are often used for this purpose. The target browser must honor the TTL value returned by the adversary and re-resolve the adversary's DNS name after initial contact.
- The adversary must serve some web content that a victim accesses initially. This content must include executable content that queries the adversary's DNS name (to provide the second DNS resolution) and then performs the follow-on attack against the internal system. The adversary also requires a customized DNS server that serves an IP address for their registered DNS name, but which resolves subsequent requests by a single client to addresses internal to that client's network.
| Medium |
|---|
| Setup DNS server and the adversary's web server. Write a malicious script to allow the victim to connect to the web server. |
| Integrity | Authorization | Access Control | Accountability | Authentication | Confidentiality | Non-Repudiation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Modify Data | Execute Unauthorized Commands (Run Arbitrary Code) | Bypass Protection Mechanism | Gain Privileges | Gain Privileges | Read Data | Gain Privileges |
| Gain Privileges | ||||||
| Bypass Protection Mechanism |
- The adversary registers a domain name, such as www.evil.com with IP address 1.3.5.7, delegates it to their own DNS server (1.3.5.2), and uses phishing links or emails to get HTTP traffic. Instead of sending a normal TTL record, the DNS server sends a very short TTL record (for example, 1 second), preventing DNS response of entry[www.evil.com, 1.3.5.7] from being cached on victim's (192.168.1.10) browser. The adversary's server first responds to the victim with malicious script such as JavaScript, containing IP address (1.3.5.7) of the server. The adversary uses XMLHttpRequest (XHR) to send HTTP request or HTTPS request directly to the adversary's server and load response. The malicious script allows the adversary to rebind the host name to the IP address (192.168.1.2) of a target server that is behind the firewall. Then the server responds to the adversary's real target, which is an internal host IP (192.168.1.2) in the same domain of the victim (192.168.1.10). Because the same name resolves to both these IP addresses, browsers will place both IP addresses (1.3.5.7 and 192.168.1.2) in the same security zone and allow information to flow between the addresses. Further, the adversary can achieve scanning and accessing all internal hosts in the victim's local network (192.168.X.X) by sending multiple short-lived IP addresses.