In the maliciously manipulated HTTP response, an adversary can add duplicate header fields that HTTP agents interpret as belonging to separate responses. The combined HTTP response ends up being parsed or interpreted as two or more HTTP responses by the targeted client HTTP agent. This allows malicious HTTP responses to bypass security controls. This is performed by the abuse of interpretation and parsing discrepancies in different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) or client HTTP agents (e.g., web browser) in the path of the malicious HTTP responses. This attack usually involves the misuse of the HTTP headers: Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding. These abuses are discussed in RFC 2616 4.4.3 and section 4.2 and are related to ordering and precedence of these headers. [REF-38] Additionally this attack can be performed through modification and/or fuzzing of parameters composing the request-line of HTTP messages. This attack is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents. This differs from CAPEC-33 HTTP Request Smuggling, which is usually an attempt to compromise a back-end HTTP agent via HTTP Request messages. HTTP Response Smuggling is an attempt to compromise aclient agent (e.g., web browser). HTTP Splitting (CAPEC-105 and CAPEC-34) is different from HTTP Smuggling due to the fact that during implementation of asynchronous requests, HTTP Splitting requires the embedding/injection of arbitrary HTML headers and content through user input into browser cookies or Ajax web/browser object parameters like XMLHttpRequest.